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MIRANDA'S MISTAKE
William J. Stuntz*

The oddest thing about Miranda1 is its politics - a point rein
forced by the decision in, and the reaction to, Dickerson v. United
States.2 In D ickerson, the Supreme Court faced the question whether
Miranda ought to be overturned, either directly or by permitting leg

islative overrides. The lawyers,3 the literature,4 and the Court5 split
along right-left - or, in the Court's case, right-center - lines, with the
right seeking to do away with Miranda's restrictions on police ques
tioning, and the left (or center) seeking to maintain them.
The split is familiar. Reactions to Miranda have always divided
along ideological lines, with the right arguing that it handcuffs the po
lice,6 and the left arguing that it offers needed protection to otherwise
helpless suspects.7 For the past generation, Miranda, the exclusionary
rule, and the death penalty have formed the criminal justice system's
trilogy of ideological markers, issues that separated the true believers
of one side from the true believers of the other. To be sure, the left's
embrace of Miranda has always been half-hearted, tinged with disap
pointment that Earl Warren's opinion did not go farther and ban un-

*
Professor, Harvard Law School. I thank Ron Allen, Paul Cassell, John Jeffries, Yale
Kamisar, Richard Leo, Dan Richman, Mike Seidman, Carol Steiker, George Thomas, and
Lloyd Weinreb for insightful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Matt Iverson and Gina
Paik for excellent research assistance.

1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
3. Compare Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance of the
Judgment Below at 40-45, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525)
(arguing that Miranda should be partially overruled), with Brief for Amicus Curiae the
American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner at 3-14, id. (arguing that Miranda
"is an appropriate and necessary means of enforcing the Fifth Amendment").
4. Compare, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress Overrule Miranda?, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 883 (2000) (arguing that Congress cannot overrule Miranda), with, e.g., Paul G.
Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85
IOWA L. REV. 175 (1999) (arguing, in effect, that it can and did).
5. Compare Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333-35 (emphasizing Miranda's constitutional
roots), with id. at 2346 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing Miranda as "an illegitimate ex
ercise of our authority to review state-court judgments").
6. E.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055
(1998).
7. E.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987).
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counseled questioning altogether.8 But whenever Miranda has been
seriously challenged, those who believe in protecting criminal sus
pects' interests have rallied to its defense, on the Court and in the law
reviews. The success of that defense in Dickerson - written by the
Chief Justice, no less - seems to show that, in this area at least, the
left has won the day, leaving the right carping from the sidelines.
So what is strange about this picture? One answer is that left and
right have it backward. Miranda imposes only the slightest of costs on
the police, and its existence may well forestall more serious, and more
successful, regulation of police questioning. The right should therefore
be either indifferent to Miranda or supportive of it. Meanwhile,
Miranda does nothing to protect suspects against abusive police tac

tics. The left should therefore be its enemy, and should rejoice at the
prospect of seeing it fall, since anything that took its place would likely
be an improvement.
Another, better answer is that Miranda should attract support
from neither right nor left. Its effects are probably small, perhaps van
ishingly so. But what effects it has are probably perverse - a conclu
sion that holds, oddly enough, no matter which side of the left-right
divide one is on. The general reaction to the Court's decision in
D ickerson, in the press and in the great majority of conversations
among lawyers and law students, was celebration; listening to those
conversations, one had the sense that the criminal justice system had
dodged a constitutional bullet. The reaction is misplaced. D ickerson
represents not a bullet dodged but an opportunity missed. As things
stand now, from almost any plausible set of premises, police interroga
tion is badly regulated. Because of Dickerson, it will continue to be
badly regulated for a long time to come.
The reason has to do with Miranda's regulatory strategy. The es
sence of that strategy was to shift, from courts to suspects, the burden
of separating good police interrogation from bad. Instead of courts de
ciding based on all the circumstances (or at least all the circumstances
disclosed during the suppression hearing) whether the suspect's con
fession was voluntary, Miranda left it for suspects to decide, by either
agreeing to talk or by calling a halt to questioning and/or calling for
the help of a lawyer, whether the police were behaving too coercively.
A growing literature on the empirics of police questioning shows why
that strategy has failed. Suspects do not, in fact, separate good ques-

8. E.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to
Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987). Miranda disappointed the left for an
other reason as well: The Court did nothing to ensure an objective record of the interroga
tion, leaving suppression hearings in the same situation - swearing matches between sus
pects and police officers - they were in before Miranda was decided. For the classic
criticism of pre-Miranda doctrine along these lines, see Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of A merican Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR
TIME 85-88 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965).
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tioning from bad; once suspects agree to talk to police, they almost
never call a halt to questioning or invoke their right to have the assis
tance of counsel. Instead, suspects separate themselves, not the police,
into two categories: talkative and quiet. The sorting says nothing at all
about the police, because it happens before police questioning has be
gun, hence before any police coercion has begun. Rather, the sorting is
a signal of the suspect's savvy and experience. Because of Miranda,
sophisticated suspects have a right to be free from questioning alto
gether - not simply free from coercive questioning - while unsophis
ticated suspects have very nearly no protection at all. The first group
receives more than it deserves, while the second receives less than it
needs.
This problem is hard to solve without introducing distributive un
fairness into a system that already has too much of it. Any system that
separates good police interrogation from bad will tend to benefit some
suspects, by making it a little harder for police to get confessions from
those suspects, relative to others. The winners in this regulatory game
are likely to be the savvy suspects, the ones who have the most sophis
ticated understanding of their situation, and who can therefore best
manipulate the system to their benefit. These savvy suspects are in
turn likely to be defined by either wealth or experience - meaning
experience dealing with the system, something that recidivists natu
rally possess. The most vulnerable suspects, which includes those with
the least experience dealing with the system, are helped, if at all, only
indirectly.
In distributive terms, the best system is probably one in which eve
ryone talks - or, at the least, one in which everyone submits to ques
tioning - but where police tactics are effectively regulated. Miranda
reversed that outcome, leaving only some suspects exposed to ques
tioning but also leaving police tactics unregulated. In other words,
Miranda's mistake was to sort suspects rather than police tactics. It
may be impossible to sort police tactics without sorting suspects, but
we could at least try. We could, for example, take away the Miranda
right to be free from questioning (though not the Fifth Amendment
right not to answer9), and thereby put all suspects on a more level

9. One might respond that the right to be free from questioning is, as a practical matter,
the same as the right to be free from compelled questioning, because police interrogation is
inherently coercive. That line of argument would seem to lead to the conclusion that
Miranda, or something like it, is required by the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Schulhofer,
supra note 7.
In fact, the conclusion does not follow from the argument. If all police interrogation
violates the Fifth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment requires abolishing police interroga
tion. Miranda does not do that. If, on the other hand, only some police interrogation violates
the Fifth Amendment, it follows that there is no blanket Fifth Amendment right to be free
from questioning, only a right to be free from the kind of questioning that compels an an
swer. To put the point more simply, suspects' right to remain silent does not require that po
lice officers have a duty to remain silent.
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playing field; the only way to regulate police tactics would then be to
look hard at them, case by case, with the aid of video- and audiotape.
That approach might not work; it might be that regulating police inter
rogation fairly and cost-effectively is impossible. For now, we cannot
know. That is the real cost of Miranda
a bad regulatory scheme re
moved all possibility of developing a good one, a state of affairs that
D ickerson ensures will continue.
Part I of this Essay describes the regulatory problem Miranda doc
trine seems designed to solve. Part II explains why the solution has un
-

raveled. Part III explores the distributive consequences of the unrav
eling.
I.

VOLUNTARINESS' PROBLEM, MIRANDA'S SOLUTION

As always, how one defines the problem matters a great deal. And
defining the problem with the old voluntariness standard, the regime
that Miranda replaced, was and is hard. The simplest definition is this:
Police interrogation is bad; hence, any body of law that permits much
police interrogation is bad, and the voluntariness standard permitted a
lot of police interrogation. This view makes sense on either of two as
sumptions. First, suppose that the government should be able to use
self-incriminating statements only if those statements are the product
of a rational, informed, unpressured choice. It follows that police in
terrogation ought to be abolished, or close to it, since its nature is to
convince suspects to give the police for free that which they could sell
in the course of plea negotiations. Rational, informed, unpressured
suspects will rarely make that choice.10 Second, suppose that police
should never use nondefensive violence, threats, or deceit (both active
and passive) on criminal suspects, nor should they take advantage of
suspects' ignorance or emotional vulnerability. That list of don'ts goes
far toward exhausting the list of ways in which police obtain incrimi
nating statements from suspects.11 If all those tactics are improper (for
whatever set of reasons), then police interrogation is itself improper
and again should be abolished, or nearly so. Most criminal procedure
teachers probably embrace at least one of these assumptions. The
Miranda majority may have embraced both.

If one starts from either of these assumptions, the problem with
voluntariness is obvious: It permits too much interrogation. How much
is too much? Any nontrivial amount. What is the solution? Adopt a
10. This is a bit of an oversimplification, for it assumes a limited version of rationality.
Suspects trying to minimize the odds or the extent of their punishment would not talk to po
lice; suspects seeking to clear their consciences might. The second type of suspect is certainly
rational, but in a different sense from the first.
11. See, for example, the list of successful interrogation tactics noted in Richard A. Leo
Welsh White, A dapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the
Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 431-50 (1999).

&

March 2001]

Miranda's Mistake

979

set of rules that will either forbid police interrogation altogether, or
that will forbid it save for a small exception for a few unusually
thoughtful confessions. Crafting such rules is not hard. The ACLU's
Miranda brief offered a rule that would ban police interrogation, at
least in practice: Abolish all uncounseled questioning.12 By requiring
the presence of defense counsel, that rule would have converted all
police interrogation into a species of plea negotiation, and since the
police cannot negotiate pleas, that would mean the end of police inter
rogation. Earl Warren's opinion for the Court in Miranda offered a set
of rules that would almost-but-not-quite abolish police interrogation:
Tell suspects that they have a right not to talk and that talking is un
wise (as the TV shows put it, "anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law"),13 and place a heavy burden on the gov
ernment to prove that anyone who talks notwithstanding these warn
ings did so knowingly and intelligently.14 No one can know for sure
what Warren and his colleagues expected those rules to produce, but
their natural outcome seems to be a very few station-house confes
sions by a very few unusual suspects. (That isn't what happened, of
course, but the divergence is probably due to the fact that Warren's
"heavy burden" waiver standard was never really applied.15)
Other rules might accomplish much the same thing. The law could
bar post-arrest questioning by any agents of the government. Or, it
could require the equivalent of a plea colloquy, in court with the de
fendant represented, to waive the defendant's right not to speak to the
police. With some imagination, one could generate a fairly long list of
abolitionist or near-abolitionist options. Which suggests that if the
problem is police interrogation itself, if the question is how to do away
with it, solving the problem is easy.
There is, however, another way to define the problem with the old
voluntariness standard, and by that definition the problem is a good
deal less tractable. Suppose now that police interrogation is not inher
ently, or always, or almost always, bad. Suppose instead that the
wrong sort of police interrogation is bad, either because it involves be
havior that police officers should never engage in, or because it pro
duces confessions that the government should never use (or both).
The right sort of police interrogation, though, is fine - and the right

12. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 22-25, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759).
13. 384 U.S. at 469 ("The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by
the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court.").
14. Id. at 475 (" If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defen
dant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to retained or appointed counsel.").
15. See infra text at notes 27-35.
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sort of interrogation works: It produces lots of incriminating state
ments that the government can legitimately use. This might be true if,
for example, coercive tactics (broadly defined to include not only
physical violence, but browbeating or threats or other sorts of high
pressure questioning) are seen as wrong, but deceptive tactics meaning anything that tends to reduce the cost of talking in the sus
pect's eyes16 - are not. On this set of assumptions, what the legal sys
tem needs to do with police interrogation is to regulate it, not to abol
ish it. The need is for some set of rules or standards that will lead
police to use good tactics but not bad ones, or, from the suspects' point
of view, that will produce good self-incrimination without producing
the bad kind.
That kind of sorting, one might think, is exactly what the volun
tariness standard seems designed to do - the standard asks courts to
look at all the circumstances and judge whether this interrogation, this
confession, is acceptable. But the three decades before Miranda
showed that a case-by-case voluntariness inquiry sorted badly, and at
least part of the reason was that courts had a very hard time judging,
case by case, the difference between good and bad police interrogation
tactics.17
The key source of the difficulty was that courts wanted to bar more
than just confessions produced by physical brutality; they wanted to
keep the police from applying at least extreme forms of emotional (a
better word might be "circumstantial") pressure.18 But once one as
sumes that some pressure is acceptable, it is very hard to define how
much pressure is too much. More than that, it may be impossible to
determine, based on nothing more than the testimony of a suspect and
a couple of interrogating officers, just how much pressure the suspect
actually faced when he confessed. When drawing the relevant legal
line is hard and determining the relevant facts impossible, the law is
likely to fail. By 1966, the voluntariness standard seemed to be failing,
16. I distinguish between false threats, which increase the pressure to confess, and false
promises, which decrease it. The prime example of a false promise is a tactic that falls wholly
outside Miranda's scope: the use of undercover agents. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292
(1 990) (holding that conversations with an undercover agent do not amount to "interroga
tion" covered by Miranda). The promise is that the agent is who he purports to be, that he is
not working for the police. The tactic works because that (false) promise reduces the sus
pect's fear of talking.
1 7. Yale Kamisar saw this point most clearly. Yale Kamisar, What is an Involuntary
Confession? Some Comments on lnbau & Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 742-59 (1963).
18. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (police denied suspect's request
to call his wife, and told suspect he would not call anyone until he made a statement);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (police threatened to arrest suspect's wife if sus
pect refused to confess); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (officer - a childhood
friend of the suspect - claimed he would lose his job if suspect refused to confess). In all
three of the cases just cited, the Supreme Court overturned lower-court findings that the
confessions were voluntary.
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and so could not do the job for which it was designed: It could not
separate good police tactics and good confessions from bad ones.
How does one solve that problem? There are two plausible possi
bilities. First, one might find some way to give courts better informa
tion, so that they could do a better job of drawing the line the volun
tariness standard asks them to draw. Requiring video- and audiotapes
of all interrogation sessions is the most obvious way to do that;19 there
may be others. The videotape option leaves the line-drawing difficulty
unsolved, but it does address the factfinding problem. Were it em
braced, we would learn whether the voluntariness standard's line
drawing problem really was intractable, or whether, instead, courts
could apply a consider-all-the-circumstances test effectively if only
they could know the circumstances well enough to consider them.
Second, one might shift the decision from courts, who found it
hard to make well, to some other decisionmaker who could make it
better. That option offers the hope of solving both problems at once
- if one can identify a decisionmaker who both knows the relevant
facts and can accurately gauge how much pressure the police are
placing on a suspect when they are questioning him.
There is such a decisionmaker: the suspect. He knows both the text
and the context of police questioning, and so he knows just how tightly
the police turned the screws. He also knows his own vulnerabilities, so
he knows how much pressure he actually felt. To be sure, suspects
might behave strategically: If a suspect states that questioning must
stop, that the pressure is too great, one might reasonably fear that the
suspect is concerned more with keeping the police from gathering evi
dence against him than with preventing undue police coercion. Sus
pects may do a better job of protecting their hides than protecting
their autonomy. But that self-interested nature seems to ensure accu
racy in the other direction. If, knowing he can stop the questioning if
the heat is turned up too high, the suspect nevertheless agrees to talk,
that fact strongly indicates that any questioning, and any incriminating
statements, must have been voluntary. Letting suspects draw the line
between good and bad police questioning might produce too much
protection, but at least in the abstract, it seems certain not to produce
too little.

19. The need for video- and audiotaping is the one proposition that wins universal
agreement in the Miranda literature. E.g., Paul Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: A n
Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U . L. REV. 387, 486-92 (1996); Gail Johnson, False
Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial
Interrogations, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 748-51 (1997); Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of
Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929,
934 n.19 (1995); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False
Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the A ge of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 495 (1998); Welsh S. White, False
Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards A gainst Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 153-55 (1997).
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Miranda doctrine has embraced this second option. That may not
be the choice the Miranda Court intended - Warren and his col

leagues probably thought they were choosing not-quite-abolition
rather than new-and-improved regulation.20 But it is what Miranda
doctrine in fact does. Judges have a hard time knowing how much
pressure a suspect is under, but the suspect knows. Miranda, through
the requirement of the famous warnings and through its not-as-famous
but more important invocation rules, lets the suspect decide whether
the pressure is too great.
The mechanics are familiar. The suspect is told he has the right to
remain silent, and that if he gives up that right, anything he says can be
used against him in court. He is further told (misleadingly21) that he
has the right to have counsel present during police questioning, and
that poverty is no bar to this right - if he cannot pay for a lawyer, the
court can appoint one for him free of charge.22 These warnings are
supposed to let suspects know of the power they have over police
questioning. Miranda's invocation rules define that power. If a suspect
says that he does not want to talk to police, questioning must stop.23 If
he says that he wants to see a lawyer, questioning must stop and may
not begin again except at the suspect's instigation.24 Any statements
obtained in violation of these rules are inadmissible against the sus
pect.2s
Taken together, warnings and invocation rules should divide sus
pects into three groups. The first group consists of suspects who in
voke their rights - those who utter the magic words, "I don't want to
talk; I want to see a lawyer" - as soon as the warnings are given, be
fore questioning begins. Call these suspects Silent Types. For them,
Miranda amounts to the abolition of police questioning, for as soon as

20. The best evidence for this proposition is the Court's waiver standard, which seems
designed to make waivers exceptional. See supra note 14.
21. Actually, Miranda does not give suspects a right to counsel, but only a right not to be
questioned in counsel's absence. The usual, and proper, response to a suspect's demand to
see a lawyer is not to give him a lawyer, but to stop questioning him.
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
23. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Mosley permits police to renew questioning
after some respite. Id. at 103-07 (holding that suspect's invocation was "scrupulously hon
ored" where police waited two hours before resuming questioning, and where the question
ing was about a different crime).
24. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981).
25. At least in the government's case-in-chief. Defendant's statements can be used to
impeach his testimony if he takes the stand at trial. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
There is a fair amount of argument that this rule seriously undermines Miranda. For the best
discussions, see Leo & White, supra note 11, at 453-64; Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 140-70 (1998). I take no position on the merits of that
argument, for I believe Miranda's regulatory mechanism cannot operate successfully re
gardless of what rule one adopts for impeachment.
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the magic words are uttered, questioning is barred; in other words,
questioning is over before it has begun. The second group consists of
suspects who are willing to be questioned, but only if the questioning
is not too uncomfortable. Call them Conditional Talkers. Miranda
gives them the right to stop questioning when it becomes too intense
or abusive; for them, Miranda's magic words are a means of regulating
police questioning rather than abolishing it. The third group includes
suspects who are willing to talk and lack the ability (or fortitude, or
knowledge, or something) to call a halt to coercive questioning. Call
them Unconditional Talkers. They will respond to police pressure by
talking, not by invoking their Miranda rights.
There is little the police can do about Silent Types (save convinc
ing them, if possible, to be something else). And there is nothing the
police need to do about Unconditional Talkers (save questioning them
until they talk). But the police may not know who the Unconditional
Talkers are; they do not, after all, announce themselves. If that is so,
and if there are enough Conditional Talkers in the mix, the police are
forced to treat all suspects other than Silent Types as if they were
Conditional Talkers, as if they might call a halt to questioning if it be
came too uncomfortable. Since the police want admissible confessions,
they have a strong incentive to figure out the boundaries Conditional
Talkers will draw, and to stay within those boundaries. That should
lead police to adopt tactics that keep pressure and abuse low, that re
assure suspects rather than frighten them, lest these Conditional
Talkers decide that they no longer wish to talk and slam the door on
police questioning by invoking their Miranda rights.
In this way, Conditional Talkers' preferences, their view of which
police tactics cause too much discomfort, should function exactly like a
legal standard.26 The only difference is that the standard comes from
suspects rather than from a court or legislature. If police comply with

26. There is one sense in which Conditional Talkers' preferences are quite different
from a legal standard. A standard, though uncertain, is more or less constant across cases.
Here, the standard is individual-specific: If a given suspect decides that the heat has been
turned up too high, he invokes; another suspect, under exactly the same circumstances,
might be entirely comfortable with the police tactics and so might not invoke. This feature of
the invocation "standard" might, in theory, give rise to the following police tactic: ratchet up
the pressure, bit by bit, until the suspect either talks or invokes. If he invokes, well, the po
lice obviously couldn't have gotten him to talk anyway, since all pressure shy of the invoca
tion line failed. So much for the invocation standard.
But this police tactic cannot work, at least not as an ordinary practice. First, pressure
cannot be fine-tuned; police officers do not have it in their power to calibrate precisely the
level of stress they are imposing on a suspect. Second, it is not always true that more pres
sure yields higher odds of obtaining a confession. Some police interrogation tactics involve
reassuring suspects, not pressuring them. Add to those two facts another: Police do not know
in advance when any particular suspect will invoke his Miranda rights; they can only know
what most suspects (or perhaps most suspects of a particular type) do. It follows from those
three facts that the police have a substantial incentive to avoid crossing the normal suspect
invocation line, because if they do so, they may forfeit whatever chance they had (and the
chance might have been substantial) at getting the suspect to incriminate himself.
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the standard, they have some chance of getting incriminating state
ments. If police transgress the standard, that chance disappears - the
door closes, and only the suspect can open it again. Since noncoercive
questioning is likely to maximize the chances of getting confessions,
police should, over time, find more and better ways to engage in such
questioning. Since coercive questioning leads to invocations, police
should, over time, abandon its use. By using their power to invoke
their Miranda rights, Conditional Talkers should be able not only to
separate good police questioning from bad, but to encourage police to
shift their energies from bad questioning to good. And this is true even
if there are a fair number of Unconditional Talkers, as long as (i) po
lice do not know who the Unconditional Talkers are, and (ii) there are
enough Conditional Talkers for police to care about obtaining their·
incriminating statements.
The one problem with this system is the Silent Types. They offer
no bonus to police for good questioning, because they invoke their
Miranda rights before questioning has begun. And they offer no pun
ishment for bad questioning, for the same reason. Silent Types do not
defeat the regulatory regime - as long as there are some Conditional
Talkers, the police have an incentive to question those suspects in
ways that will prevent invocations. But Silent Types also do nothing to
advance the regulatory regime. If the goal of Miranda is to regulate
police questioning rather than to abolish it, Silent Types are unde
serving beneficiaries, the recipients of a windfall. Thus, a good way to
tell whether Miranda is seeking to eliminate police questioning or to
reform it is to see whether the doctrine maximizes the number of
Silent Types or keeps that number as low as possible.
Earl Warren's "heavy burden" waiver standard might have pro
duced a great many Silent Types. The Miranda waiver standard as it
was refined in the 1 970s and 1 980s, on the other hand, keeps that
number fairly small. Under North Carolina v. Butler,27 suspects can
waive their Miranda rights and agree to submit to police questioning
without any formalities. If having heard the warnings, the suspect goes
ahead and talks to the police, the talking itself constitutes a waiver.28
Under Connecticut v. Barrett,29 suspects' ignorance of the practical
consequences of talking to the police is no bar to waiver. (Barrett told
police he would not make any written statement but would be happy

27. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
28. In Butler, the defendant refused to sign a waiver form but proceeded to talk to the
police. Id. at 370-71. The Court found a valid Miranda waiver, in an opinion that emphasized
that such waivers need not be explicit but can be inferred from the suspect's conduct. Id. at
373-76.
29. 479 U.S. 523 (1987).
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to talk to them, which he proceeded to do, on tape.30 The likely expla
nation is that Barrett assumed only written statements could hurt him
- a clear error, but one that did not invalidate Barrett's waiver.31)
Under Colorado v. Spring,32 police can ask a suspect about different
crimes than the one for which the suspect was arrested; the surprise
does not defeat the suspect's Miranda waiver.33 And under Moran v.
Burbine,34 police can keep a suspect's lawyer from seeing him; as long
as the suspect does not ask for the lawyer, his Miranda waiver remains
valid.35 Suspects can hear the warnings and talk to police out of igno
rance, confusion, or misplaced confidence. No matter: As long as they
actually hear the warnings and actually talk to the police, Miranda is
satisfied. This standard does .not eliminate Silent Types, but it substan
tially reduces their number.
It bears emphasizing that these lax waiver decisions are a natural
corollary to using Miranda to encourage good police questioning (and
to discourage the bad kind). If that is Miranda's object, courts should
give police a good deal of leeway to persuade suspects to talk - as
long as those same courts strictly enforce the ban on post-invocation
questioning. To put it another way, if Miranda is meant to eliminate
police questioning, the key event is the warnings. Once the warnings
are given, questioning should be rare; most suspects should be Silent
Types. But if Miranda is meant to regulate police questioning, the key
to the regime is invocation. Warnings are merely a device to ensure
that invocations sometimes happen. As long as Conditional Talkers
can invoke their rights, and thereby put a stop to questioning, police
will stay away from tactics that cause invocations, and the system will
regulate effectively. The fewer Silent Types, and the more Conditional
Talkers, the better.
Interestingly, the same Supreme Court that decided the waiver
cases mentioned above has remained fairly strict about invocations.
Edwards v. Arizona36 held that not only do Miranda's magic words
close the door on questioning, the door must stay closed until the sus
pect opens it.37 Minnick v. Mississippi38 held that the Edwards ban lasts

30. Unfortunately for the police, the tape recorder didn't work, so one of the interro
gating officers had to reduce the confession to writing from memory. Id. at 525-26.
31. The Court declined to adopt this explanation, see id. at 530 n.4, but it remains the
most - maybe the only - plausible explanation for Barrett's behavior.
32. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
33. Id. at 575-76.
34. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
35. Id. at 416-18, 421-28.
36. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
37. Id. at 484-85.
38. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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as long as custody lasts.39 These decisions are as natural as Butler,
Barrett, Spring, and Burbine. They make sense on the premise that
Miranda chiefly protects not Silent Types but Conditional Talkers,

and that by protecting Conditional Talkers, Miranda ensures that po
lice engage in only the right kinds of interrogation tactics. In this way,
Miranda's not-quite-abolitionist rule has been converted to a regula
tory standard, a standard that gives suspects the power to sort police
tactics, and thereby gives police the incentive to change their behavior
for the better.
II.

MIRANDA'S MISTAKE

As the preceding account suggests, Miranda's heroes are the
Conditional Talkers - they are the ones who keep the police on the
right side of the coercion line, even while giving the system the confes
sions it needs. And for Miranda to work as it should, Conditional
Talkers must be good at their job: They must invoke their rights when
the heat is turned up too high in order to keep police honest. It is
worth considering, then, just what characteristics Conditional Talkers
must have.
First, they must be willing to talk. Since Miranda uses suspects to
regulate police questioning, suspects must be willing to be questioned,
or there can be no regulation. The fact of police questioning alone
cannot deter Conditional Talkers, or Miranda's mechanism can never
get off the ground. This requires that Conditional Talkers have one of
a mix of motives or sensibilities: guilt, of the sort that might lead one
to confess when it is against one's interest to do so; ignorance of the
fact that talking to police is against one's interest; fear of angering the
police by refusing to talk; or optimism, the belief that one can talk
one's way out of trouble. Second, they must be willing and able to in
voke their rights if questioning becomes too coercive. This requires a
combination of knowledge and courage - the knowledge that sus
pects have real power over the police, along with the courage to use
that power when the police behave badly.
Consider how those characteristics fit together. Ignorance of the
consequences of talking is technically consistent with knowledge of the
power to stop police questioning. But they are surely in some tension.
The first characteristic requires that suspects misunderstand one of the
four Miranda warnings - "anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law." (This was Barrett's mistake.) The sec
ond requires that suspects understand the other three warnings - the
right not to answer questions, the right to have outside assistance, and

39. Id. at 150-56. The one major exception to the pattern is Davis v. United States, which
holds that only an unequivocal assertion of the right of silence or the right to counsel counts
as a Miranda invocation. 5 12 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994).
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the right to insist that the state pay for the assistance.40 That combina
tion of ignorance and knowledge may be common among criminal
suspects, but it would hardly be surprising if it were not. Similarly, fear
of police anger does not logically exclude a willingness to stand up to
the police by calling a halt to questioning. But a suspect who is fearful
before questioning has even begun is unlikely to be more courageous
later, when the pressure is greater and circumstances are more bleak.
Optimism seems more promising: A suspect with a great deal of confi
dence in his verbal abilities might also have the knowledge and cour
age needed to force the police to behave properly. But optimism, in
this context, is irrational. Suspects are not likely to be better at trick
ing the police than the police are at tricking them; the police, after all,
do it for a living. And if a suspect has information that is valuable to
the government, he can get something for it - charging or sentencing
concessions, perhaps even a dismissal. To do that, though, he must ne
gotiate not with the police but with the district attorney's office, and to
do that, he must work through defense counsel.41 Trying to talk one's
way out of trouble in the police station is a little like trying to sell
something to a thief - the sale won't happen, but the thief will get the
goods anyway. Such irrationality sits uncomfortably with the kind of
knowledge of one's rights, and of how to use them, that Miranda re
quires.
Guilt may be an exception. Suspects who feel guilty can be both
knowledgeable and courageous; there is no inconsistency unless one
assumes feelings of guilt are stupid or cowardly, and such an assump
tion would plainly be unfair. But suspects who confess out of guilt are
not likely to attract abusive police questioning anyway; police should
find it easy to obtain their confessions without coercion. In other
words, suspects who confess out of guilt or conscience are likely not to
be Conditional Talkers in the first place; they are better classified as
Unconditional Talkers.
We are left with the following picture. For Miranda to function as
it should, Conditional Talkers must be at once ignorant and knowl
edgeable, fearful and courageous, irrationally optimistic and unusually
sophisticated. Perhaps a fair number of suspects have this odd set of
characteristics. We should not discount that possibility. Police interro
gation is a stressful situation that may call forth strange reactions; it is
also a dynamic situation, one in which suspects may be confident one

40. Actually, it requires even more than understanding those three warnings. A suspect
might understand that he has the right not to talk but not realize he has the right to force the
police to stop asking him questions. The latter right, which Edwards and Minnick establish,
see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text, is not described by any of the Miranda warn
ings.
41. A recent reminder of this fact is the First Circuit's decision that an FBI agent's
promises of immunity to an informant were not binding. United States v. Flemmi, 225 F 3d
78 (1st Cir. 2000).
.
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moment and terrified the next. In the abstract, no one can say for cer
tain how large numbers of suspects will respond to it. But we can say
this much: It would be no great surprise to find that only a very few
suspects respond by both talking to police and, if the heat is turned up
too high, invoking their rights. If it is possible that Conditional Talkers
are common, it is also possible that they are quite rare.
For a long time, no one but the police knew how many Conditional
Talkers there are. Thanks to some recent work on the empirics of po
lice interrogation, we know now. Conditional Talkers are indeed rare.
The universe of suspects consists of a few Silent Types, a very small
number of Conditional Talkers, and a great many Unconditional
Talkers, who constitute the large majority of suspects. If the police
know this - and how could they not?
Miranda does not, and can
-

not, regulate police interrogation.
What is the evidence for the near nonexistence of Conditional
Talkers? A single fact: Almost no one invokes his Miranda rights once
questioning has begun. Out of the 1 82 Mirandized suspects Richard
Leo observed in three California police departments, thirty-eight in
voked their Miranda rights - but thirty-six of those invocations came
immediately after the Miranda warnings were read.42 Only two - one
percent - came during the course of police questioning. Paul Cassell
and Bret Hayman reached similar conclusions in their study of police
interrogation in Salt Lake City.43 These studies show that while invoca
tion is fairly common, invocation during questioning is rare.
And if invocation during questioning is rare, Miranda is not work
ing. Consider the three possible explanations for Leo's data. First, co
ercive interrogation could be fairly common, but suspects do not put a
stop to it by invoking their rights. Courts may be tolerating coercive
tactics because Miranda doctrine has shifted Warren's "heavy burden"
from the state to the suspect, who now must convince a judge that,
even though he heard the famous warnings, he didn't understand them
well enough to prevent the police from twisting his arm. And few sus
pects invoke in response to these coercive tactics because few suspects
have the set of characteristics Conditional Talkers must have. Police
would tend not to worry about the risk of invocation if that risk were
small; coercive interrogation tactics would then be worthwhile because
those tactics would pose only a slight risk of the suspect slamming the
door on further questioning. If this first explanation holds true,
Miranda has no effect on police behavior, save that it prevents police
questioning of Silent Types. Once the Silent Types have sorted them-

42. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.
621, 653 (1996).
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43. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 859-60 (1996) (finding only five in
vocations after interrogation had begun, out of a total of 126 interrogations).
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selves out and received their reward, police use whatever tactics
maximize their chances of getting incriminating evidence from other
suspects. Not all of those tactics are coercive, but some are.
The second explanation is more optimistic, but not about Miranda.
Police interrogation might be benign - mild deception is common;
coercion is rare - but for reasons that have little to do with Miranda.
Police culture, political forces, a fear that coercive tactics will produce
false confessions - any or all of these may push police to avoid the
kinds of interrogation that Miranda doctrine seeks to prevent. If they
do, Conditional Talkers and Unconditional Talkers alike are treated
reasonably well; there is no need for invocations. But then, those sus
pects would be treated reasonably well even if Miranda were over
turned. In this scenario, Miranda is irrelevant to police questioning,
which is effectively regulated by nonlegal forces. Only Silent Types
would be worse off if we did away with Miranda: They would have to
experience the same sorts of questioning other suspects experience
now.44
According to the first explanation of Leo's data, Miranda is a fail
ure. According to the second explanation, it is pointless. But either
way it is costly, for it prevents police from talking to Silent Types. And
though that cost is not great - there are not that many Silent Types
- it is also incurred to no purpose. Silent Types' gain is their own; it is
not shared with anyone else.
The third explanation is very different from the other two. Perhaps
Miranda is working wonderfully. Suspects may invoke their rights so
rarely because police so rarely employ the kinds of tactics that should
lead to invocations. On this view, the tiny number of invocations dur
ing police questioning shows not Miranda's failure but its success.
Miranda's deterrent, the invocation that shuts off questioning, is rarely
used precisely because it deters so well. If this is the case, the benefit
to Silent Types seems much more sensible. Silent Types may get too
much benefit from Miranda, but they do so in order to ensure that
other suspects get the protection they need and deserve.
All three of these explanations are consistent with the world Leo
and Cassell and Hayman describe, a world where invocations during
police interrogation are very rare. But which explanation is true?
The first, the most depressing one, may be the most plausible. A
decade ago in a brilliant article about Miranda's unintended conse
quences, Mike Seidman argued that courts were ignoring police mis
behavior as long as Miranda warnings were given - that police were,
in effect, free to coerce confessions as long as they Mirandized sus-

44. I am assuming that at least some - and probably most - Silent Types would no
longer be Silent Types if they were forced to submit to police questioning. It is one thing to
stay silent when the police are not allowed to ask you questions. It is quite another to remain
silent in the face of questioning.
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pects first.45 Seidman concluded that Miranda might actually make
vulnerable suspects worse off, by wrongly convincing courts that the
suspects could protect themselves.46 Even if that conclusion holds true,
claims of police coercion will be hidden; they will tend to surface only
rarely in reported opinions. Consequently, no one can know whether
Seidman's fears are justified. But they might be: Police coercion could
be common, at least in some jurisdictions. If it is, Miranda is doing
nothing to stop it.
The second conclusion - police are behaving well, but Miranda is
not responsible for the good behavior - is likewise plausible, and it
has some evidence to support it. Leo's study, the most thorough to
date, found surprisingly few instances of coercive interrogation: only 4
cases out of 182.47 It may be that the departments Leo studied were
unusual, or that police were careful to behave themselves when he was
watching. But it may also be that police interrogation is, for the most
part, healthy, that some forms of deception and advantage-taking are
common, but that coercion and abuse are not. The three "p's" - po
lice culture, professionalization, and politics - may be regulating sta
tionhouse questioning effectively.
But the third explanation - Miranda works just as it should cannot possibly be true. Police may be behaving tolerably well, but if
they are, fear of invocations cannot be responsible for their good be
havior. Were it otherwise, Miranda would work not just well but
nearly perfectly, better than any regulatory regime actually works. For
Miranda to regulate effectively consistent with the data, the threat of
invocations must deter police misconduct so well that the threat need
never (well, almost never) be carried out. That kind of near-perfect
deterrence exists only in theory.
It might be barely possible to accept the Miranda-is-working
perfectly story if the line police had to avoid crossing were utterly
clear, so that police could always be certain whether they were about
to cross it. But the line is both vague and wholly subjective. It is
vaguer than the famously vague voluntariness standard. That standard
didn't, and doesn't, have much content, but it has some. The invoca
tion line, though, has no definition at all: It amounts to the sum of the
lines Conditional Talkers would draw if pushed. To put it differently,
the invocation line consists of hypothetical data points without any
doctrinal formula, and the data points can only be known if the line is
crossed. Plus, the invocation line is different for different suspects. All

45. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 744-46 (1992).
46. Id. at 745-46 & n.241.
47. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266, 282-83 (1996). This number probably understates the true level of police coercion, if
only because the interrogating officers in Leo's study knew they were being observed. For
Leo's response to this concern, see id. at 270-72.
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of which means that police must guess where the invocation line might
be. They cannot possibly know where the line is in advance. If that line
is deterring coercive interrogation, if it exists but police are never
crossing it, they must be guessing right nearly one hundred percent of
the time. No regulated actor does that. It seems safe to assume police
aren't doing it either.
Which leaves the other two possibilities. Police interrogation may
include a lot of abusive questioning, in which case Miranda has failed.
Or, police interrogation may include very little abusive questioning, in
which case Miranda makes no difference. Either way, Miranda gives
Silent Types the valuable right to avoid questioning altogether, and
gives other suspects nothing. Total protection for the few, no protec
tion for the many - that is Miranda's achievement in a nutshell.
Perhaps this failure could be remedied with the right doctrinal
tinkering. Maybe invocations are too hard; perhaps the Supreme
Court erred when it decided that only "unequivocal" assertions of the
·

Miranda rights would count.48 If suspects only had to say "maybe I
want to see a lawyer" instead of "I want to see a lawyer" we might see
more invocations, and Miranda's regulatory mechanism might work.
But the more likely possibility, the one that better fits ordinary intui
tions about human nature and human knowledge, is that suspects can
not do the kind of sorting that Miranda doctrine calls for. If suspects
really understand the power Miranda gives them, and really under
stand the benefits of exercising that power, they will likely become
Silent Types - they will avoid questioning altogether. If that hap

pened often enough, Miranda would abolish police interrogation, not
regulate it. On the other hand, if suspects have the kind of limited un
derstanding of their situation that leads them to talk to the police in
the first place, they are likely not to be able to stop the kinds of police
questioning the law seeks to forbid. In that event Miranda leaves po
lice interrogation unregulated. If suspects know enough, they will pre
vent all questioning. If they don't know enough, they will prevent
nothing. That is why, in practice, the invocation line is drawn before,
not during, police questioning.
One of two things is true: Either there is a significant amount of
abusive police questioning, or there isn't. If there is, Miranda is a fail
ure; it does not protect the suspects who need protecting. If there isn't,
Miranda is pointless - it gives a few Silent Types a very valuable enti
tlement, but to no good end. Either way, Miranda accomplishes noth
ing save distributive perversity. After thirty-five years, we can be rea
sonably confident of this much: Suspects cannot regulate police

48. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994). For an interesting critique of the
requirement that suspects must take affirmative steps to invoke their Miranda rights, see
Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993).
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interrogation. The law of police interrogation is broken, and needs
fixing.
III. MIRA NDA

AND

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Return to the right-left divide we saw in D ickerson, the same di
vide that has dominated discussion about Miranda since it was de
cided. We are now in a position to see why that divide is misguided,
why the right opposes Miranda for the wrong reasons and the left
wrongly supports it. The right objects to Miranda because it over
regulates police interrogation (and thereby reduces the number of
admissible confessions).49 In fact, Miranda doesn't regulate police in
terrogation at all. Rather, it leaves interrogation unregulated for most
suspects, and forbidden for a few. The right should have no objection
to the first outcome, but should dislike the second. As to Silent Types,
Miranda doctrine amounts to precisely the rule the ACLU urged in
Miranda itself: no questioning without counsel. Just as the right ob
jected to that rule for all suspects, it should object to it for some.50
The left's relationship to Miranda doctrine is more interesting. As
a general matter, the left has argued that Miranda regulates police
questioning, but not enough. Hence the usual line: Miranda should be
strengthened, but it is worth defending even as is.51 This view misun
derstands what Miranda does. Miranda enacts the right's preferred
rule - no regulation - for most suspects, and the left's preferred rule
- no uncounseled questioning - for those fortunate suspects who
know enough to invoke their rights once the warnings are read. From
the left's point of view, that ought to be worse than no regulation at
all.
Consider the characteristics of Silent Types, Miranda's key benefi
ciaries. They are likely not to feel guilty: Strong feelings of guilt should
produce a desire to confess, not a determination to clam up.52 But they

49. E.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 21 8-22 (1 993);
Cassell & Fowles, supra note 6, at 1 059; Fred E. Inbau & James P. Manak, Miranda v.
Arizona
ls it Worth the Cost?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 1 85, 1 97-99 (1 988).
-

50. See note 44 supra. Though I suspect that most Silent Types would cease to be silent
if the police could question them, that suspicion is not critical to my argument. If only a few
Silent Types would talk under questioning, the point in the text still holds: For them,
Miranda stands between a chance at acquittal and certain conviction, and it does so by giving
them immunity from questioning. Even if that is only true of a small number of suspects, it
should be objectionable to those who believe that (1 ) there is nothing wrong with police
questioning, and (2) truthful confessions are good.
51 . In addition to the work of a number of other participants in this Symposium, see
Ainsworth, supra note 48, at 320-21; Ogletree, supra note 8, at 1 83 0; Irene M. Rosenberg &
Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the A bolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C.
L. REV. 69, 1 09-1 5 (1 989).
52. See GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
68 (1 992) (noting that "a feeling of guilt motivates people towards repara
tive action," such as confessing). The picture is complicated by the fact that guilty suspects
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are likely to be guilty, at least guilty of something:53 Innocent suspects'
natural reaction is to explain themselves, to tell the police they didn't
do anything wrong. Most important of all, Silent Types are likely to
know that talking to the police is a tactical error, that any relevant in
formation they have can be sold through the plea bargaining process;
it need not be given away for free in the police station.
It bears emphasizing that such knowledge does not come from
hearing the Miranda warnings - which is why most suspects don't
have it. The warnings tell suspects that they have a right not to talk,
and that if they do talk, their words can be used against them. The
warnings say nothing about alternatives to talking, like plea negotia
tions or seeking a dismissal for insufficient evidence. And the warnings
do not tell suspects that their silence will not be used against them, that
if they are guilty, refusing to talk cannot harm them.
Suspects who understand these things without being told will tend
disproportionately to fall into two groups. The first and by far the
largest is those with relevant experience, suspects who have been ar
rested for serious crimes in the past. Leo's study found that a suspect
with a felony record was four times more likely to invoke his Miranda
rights than a suspect with no criminal record, and three times more
likely to invoke than a suspect with only a misdemeanor record.54 The
smaller of the two groups is those who are wealthy enough to have
regular contact with a lawyer, such that asking for one when dealing
with agents of the government is a natural thing to do.55
Notice that these two groups are defined not by their disadvantage
but by their advantage - they are more knowledgeable than most
suspects. That advantage produces another: They are more likely to
deal with the government through counsel, not directly, and that gives
them the benefit of a lawyer's knowledge about how the system works
and how it can be made to work for them. So Miranda takes the most
advantaged suspects, the suspects who are in the best position to deal
with the police effectively, and makes them more advantaged still. It is
hard to imagine a more distributively perverse result.
may also experience shame, which "makes the person want to hide from others and not re
veal what happened." Id. Gudjonsson suggests that guilt feelings are likely to predominate
initially - for example, when the suspect is being interrogated by the police - while feel
ings of shame are more likely to predominate later. Id.
53. One piece of evidence in support of this intuition is the dramatically higher rates of
invocation by suspects who have prior convictions for serious crimes. See infra note 54 and
accompanying text.
54. Leo, supra note 47, at 286-87. This is not to say that all suspects with felony records
invoked their rights. On the contrary, more than two-thirds waived their Miranda rights. Id.
at 287 tbl. 9. But the waiver rates of other groups of suspects were much higher. Id.
55. Leo found no evidence that this group exists. Id. at 291-92 (noting absence of any
class effect on the success rate of police interrogation). But it may be that the group does not
exist because police know the outcome of any attempt at interrogating wealthier suspects in
advance. There is no way to know without overturning Miranda.
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But there is more. By giving Silent Types a pass on questioning,
Miranda makes it more expensive to prosecute and convict them, all

else being equal, than it is to prosecute and convict other suspects.
That added cost must have some effect, at least at the margin. Some
Silent Types who would otherwise be charged are let go; some who
would otherwise be convicted have charges against them dismissed;
some who would otherwise get unfavorable plea bargains get favor
able ones.
It is obvious why this result should bother the right, but it should
also bother the left. Prosecutors operate at or close to capacity; they
lack the time and manpower to dramatically expand their dockets.56
And they cannot aggressively pursue charges in all the felony cases the
police bring them. About a quarter of felony arrestees are never
prosecuted, and another quarter are charged and convicted but never
incarcerated.57 In a world with these features, if some arrestees are
harder to convict than others, prosecutors will tend to shift their atten
tion to the easier cases. Thus, Miranda not only helps Silent Types by
making them harder to prosecute. It also hurts the rest of the suspect
pool by making them relatively easier to prosecute. To see the point,
imagine that a prosecutor has a pool of ten cases, but only enough
time to go after five. Now make one of the ten a marginally tougher
case. Not only do the odds of pursuing that one go down, the odds of
pursuing each of the other nine go up.58
The point is not that the government loses more cases, that deter
rence somehow suffers. It may not: Convicting a talkative defendant
may deter just as well as convicting a quiet one. Rather, the problem is
distributive. Miranda not only protects the least vulnerable suspects
and fails to protect the most vulnerable. By protecting the former, it
actually makes the latter worse off. More punishment for the most
vulnerable suspects is hardly a program the left should find attractive.
The best defense against this charge is a depressing one: Perhaps
any regulation of police interrogation would be distributively perverse
- at least if the regulation leaves some suspects better able to fend off
police questioning than others. Any regime that distinguishes among
suspects in police interrogation - any regime that makes it easier for
some class of suspects to avoid talking - is likely to advantage more

56. For a discussion of the evidence for this proposition, see William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 2426 (1997).
57. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1997, at 437 tbl. 5.70, 439 tbl.
5.72 (Kathleen Maguire & Anne L. Pastore eds., 1998) [hereinafter 1997 SOURCEBOOK].
58. This is where Miranda's critics on the right fall down. The tacit assumption those
critics make is that dockets are fixed - that no case dropped because of Miranda is replaced
by another case. The opposite assumption is more reasonable.
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knowledgeable suspects. That means Miranda's beneficiaries would be
the beneficiaries of any regime that put limits on police questioning.
That sad conclusion may not hold true; on the current state of the
evidence we cannot know. Regulating police interrogation in ways
that avoid distributive injustice may be possible if the law can do two
things at once: maximize the number of suspects who talk to the po
lice, while minimizing the frequency with which police use abusive in
terrogation tactics. The usual assumption is that if police are disabled
from using some interrogation tactics, some nontrivial number of sus
pects will keep quiet. We will see fewer confessions if torture is barred
than if it is allowed, fewer confessions if threats and browbeating are
rare than if they are common. That assumption makes some sense, and
it may be right. But it may be wrong. Remember that guilty suspects
need not confess for interrogation to be useful; in general, if the sus
pect says much of anything the police benefit, and benefit substan
tially.59 It may be that, as to any given suspect, a wide range of police
tactics would provoke some kind of response, some statement that po
lice could either build on or poke holes in.60 Some of those successful
tactics are easier for the police than others, and the easiest tactics may
be among the most offensive. If all that is true, banning offensive po
lice interrogation tactics need not cause any appreciable decline in the
rate at which suspects incriminate themselves. It may simply make po
lice interrogation both a little more expensive for the police and a lot
more decent for suspects. It may be possible to make police interroga
tion both successful (from the police perspective) and fair, at least if
fairness permits a range of noncoercive tactics.
Miranda certainly doesn't achieve that result. Inviting suspects not
to talk, as Miranda requires, is a poor way to maximize the number of
suspects who do talk. And leaving questioning essentially unregulated,
as Miranda also does, is a poor way to ensure that questioning is fair.
But while Miranda falls off the regulatory tightrope (in both direc
tions - a rare achievement), a new-and-improved voluntariness stan
dard might not. Let the police question everyone - give suspects the
right to keep quiet, but not the right to avoid questioning. Require an
accurate recording of the questioning, with video and audio, so that we
are not faced with the swearing matches that plague suppression

59. Anyone who has ever spoken to a police officer about interrogation practices knows
this proposition is true, but the legal literature barely acknowledges it. For an exception to
that pattern, see George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A
"Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 949-50 (1996). For a discussion
of how statements other than confessions are useful in developing a case against a suspect,
see FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 70-76 ( 1 986).
60. This seems to fit with Leo's findings concerning the number of different tactics po
lice use. Leo found four separate interrogation tactics with at least a 90% success rate, and
another ten tactics with a success rate in excess of 75% . Leo, supra note 47, at 294 tbl. 14. He
also found evidence that police use overlapping lists of tactics on different classes of sus
pects. Id. at 295-96 tbl. 15.
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hearings now. Then let judges sort out the cases. This amounts to vol
untariness with better evidence. If judges can sort reasonably well, if
they can separate good police interrogation from the bad kind once
they know the facts, it might work. Of course, voluntariness with bet
ter evidence is still voluntariness, and neither judges nor anyone else
has figured out how to define the difference between voluntary and
involuntary statements. Yet judges need not necessarily define the
voluntariness line in order to apply it. Definition may be beyond the
law's capability. Application may nevertheless be possible. Sometimes,
"I know it when I see it" works.61 We should find out whether that is
the case here.
In short, in distributive terms, we should be striving to make it easy
for police to get suspects to talk, as long as they avoid producing false
confessions and abusive police tactics. Miranda reaches neither half of
that goal. Better to force Silent Types to listen to questions, as is func
tionally the case with the rest of the suspect pool. Meanwhile, case-by
case voluntariness would leave other suspects no worse off than they
are now, and probably a little better off. That is a distributive goal
worth seeking.
One might imagine the following counter-argument: There is a way
to improve the welfare of the many Unconditional Talkers w ithout
harming the few Silent Types. Instead of subjecting all suspects to
questioning, we could instead question none of them. Ratchet the
standard up rather than down; bring all suspects to the position Silent
Types enjoy instead of pulling Silent Types down to the level of
Unconditional Talkers. Return to Earl Warren's vision of Miranda,
"heavy burden" waiver standard and all.
That position, the left's ideal, might be the worst of all in terms of
distributive justice. Consider the position of suspects who are both
poor and innocent. Their poverty makes it hard for them to fight the
state successfully; indeed, it is likely to be hard for them to convince
even their own lawyers, who are used to clients who falsely claim they
didn't commit the crime.62 Once the police and prosecution are con
vinced these poor-and-innocent suspects are guilty, victory for the
suspects is very unlikely. Their real chance at success, their best hope
of escaping wrongful punishment, lies in convincing the government

61. This phrase appeared most famously in Justice Stewart's concurrence in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Stewart used it to capture the essence of the legal standard then
applied to obscenity. Id. at 197. Stewart's point, I think, was that the obscenity standard was
impossible to define but quite possible, maybe even easy, to apply. For a slightly different
understanding of Stewart's phrase, and a defense of the kind of judging it suggested, see Paul
Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023 (1 996).
62. The difficulty defendants have in "selling" their lawyers is a function of two things:
the frequency with which defendants falsely claim innocence, and the resource constraints
under which defense lawyers operate. The former makes defendants incredible, and the lat
ter makes investigating their stories impossible.
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that a mistake has been made. Thus, 28 % of felony arrestees are not
charged with any crime; another 23 % are convicted but never incar
cerated, presumably because of a favorable plea bargain.63 But only a
little more than 1 % are acquitted at trial.64 In a system that generates
numbers like those, the poor-and-innocent need to maximize their
chances of favorable discretionary decisions by police and prosecutors.
That means maximizing their chances of distinguishing themselves
from other, guiltier suspects. Police interrogation offers one of the
best opportunities to do just that. If police can ask suspects questions
before the suspects have had a chance to craft effective stories, there is
some chance that the police can separate the false denials from the
true ones. If all questioning is done through lawyers - which is what
abolition of police questioning means - that chance is much smaller.
This point holds true even if, as is clearly the case, innocent sus
pects sometimes confess to crimes they didn't commit.65 Police inter
rogation probably raises the odds of convicting all suspects - if all
cases went to trial. The innocent and the guilty alike may make in
criminating statements in the police station. But as long as the guilty
make incriminating statements more often, the innocent probably
benefit from a system that allows police to ask questions. In a system
like ours, a system with the kinds of resource constraints that force
prosecutors to dismiss charges in a large fraction of cases, what mat
ters to the poor-and-innocent is not the odds that the state could con
vict them at trial, but rather the gap between those odds and the odds
that the state could convict their guilty counterparts. That is why the
poor-and-innocent benefit from broader evidence gathering. Rich sus
pects, guilty and innocent, can use their wealth to make it harder for
the state to punish them. Poor suspects lack that option; the best thing
for them is to make it easier for the state to punish other poor sus
pects, in a world in which the state will not punish everyone. Anything
that helps to distinguish the innocent poor from the guilty poor is a
boon to the former.
To see the point, imagine two systems, one with Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rules that are very favorable to the government, the
other with rules that are very favorable to the defense. In both sys
tems, the odds of convicting defendants who go to trial depend in part

63. 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 57, at 437 tbl. 5.70, 439 tbl. 5.72.
64. E. g., BARBARA BOLAND ET AL., THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS - 1987,
at 1 (1990).
·

·

65. On the reality of false confessions, see GUDJONSSON, supra note 52, at 226-28;
Johnson, supra note 19, at 729-30; Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, in
THE MIRANDA DEBATE 271 , 272-73 (Richard A. Leo & George c. Thomas III, eds., 1998);
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 19, at 430-31 ; White, supra note 19, at 108-09. For an argument that
false confessions rarely, if ever, lead to convictions, see Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the
"Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False
Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523 (1999).
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on the defendants' guilt - trials do not sort randomly - but the odds
that innocent defendants would be convicted at trial are positive trials also do not sort perfectly. Assume that in the first, pro
government system, the odds that guilty defendants would be con
victed at trial are 90% ; for innocent defendants, the odds are 50% . In
the second, pro-defendant system, the odds are 45% for guilty sus
pects and 30% for innocents. If all cases go to trial, innocents would
obviously prefer the second system. But if police and prosecutors pur
sue only some fraction of cases, innocents would likely prefer the first.
A prosecutor pays a large price for mistaking a 50% case for a 90%
case; the price of confusing 30% cases with 45 % cases is much smaller.
It follows that prosecutors will make more such mistakes. And in the
more pro-defendant world, acquittals will be much more common,
meaning that any one of them is less salient, hence less costly for
prosecutors. Plus, 50% and 90% cases will look more different to po
lice and to prosecutors than 30% and 45% cases. All distinctions help
those with stronger claims.66
None of this proves that abolishing police interrogation would
harm the innocent poor. But it might. And that would be the most se
rious distributive injustice the system could tolerate. Abolition (or
near abolition, the original Miranda position) might make for an even
less just system than we have now. Deregulation, letting the police
question whomever they want however they want, allows a different
kind of injustice, the kind that flows from abusive police questioning.
Miranda doctrine manages to capture the worst features of both. It
abolishes police interrogation for the favored few, and leaves it un

regulated for the less favored many. Whatever the right answer to the
question how best to deal with police interrogation, surely it cannot be
that.
IV. CONCLUSION
Miranda is not a disaster, as some on the right have suggested. It
would be hard for it to be a disaster, given that its effects seem so
small. But it is also not the guardian of our liberties that its defenders
think it is. It is, rather, a modest failure, a missed chance to do some
thing about abusive police interrogation - and a small contributor to
distributive injustice in an already distributively unjust system.
The best case for Miranda is that something was done - police
needed to professionalize, and police culture needed to develop a
greater sense of respect for suspects' rights, and those things have
happened. (Whether Miranda caused them is another matter.) Few
observers of American police forces would deny that there has been

66. The argument in this paragraph is made in more detail in William J. Stuntz,
Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1930-33 (1993).

March 2001 )

Miranda's Mistake

999

substantial improvement in police treatment of suspects since 1 966.67
But the work seems incomplete - there is surely some abusive ques
tioning going on in some departments, and there is no reason to be
lieve Miranda is discouraging it. Meanwhile, the suspects who need
Miranda's protection least are the ones who use it most. One way or
another, we ought to change that picture.
The only way to change it for the better is to have courts return to
the role they played before Miranda, as drawers of the line between
good and bad police interrogation. Miranda represents an experiment
in having someone else draw that line. The experiment failed. Hard as
it is to define, the line must be drawn (at least it must be drawn if abu
sive police interrogation still exists). And courts are the right entities
to draw it. Perhaps with better evidence of the kind that videotape of
fers, the line can be drawn with reasonable accuracy at reasonable
cost. Or perhaps not - in which case the system should choose be
tween abolishing police interrogation and deregulating it. Given that
choice, deregulation is probably better, as it better protects the sus
pects whose claim on our sympathies is greatest: those who are both
poor (in money and education) and innocent. Even if that conclusion
is wrong, better that we face the choice squarely rather than abolishing
interrogation for some suspects and deregulating it for others, as
Miranda does.
Sadly, none of these changes is likely to happen. Miranda suc
ceeded in one key respect: It established an equilibrium that both po
lice officers and courts, the regulated and the regulators, were willing
to live with. Productive change requires that the equilibrium be upset.
The Court could have done that in Dickerson, but didn't. It may be a
long time before the next opportunity arises.

67. But cf Cassell, supra note 19, at 473-78 (arguing that police in 1966 were already
fairly professionalized).

